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Enabling Software Acquisition Improvement
Executive Summary
Reduce the Rate of  Increase of SW Size and Complexity 
by Developing Truly Open Architecture Based Software 
Components
Decrease the % of DoD / Navy System Cost, Schedule, 
and Technical Performance Failures
Current
Trends
Reconstitute Gov’t In-House SW SMEs and Leadership to 
Improve SW Acquisition Management and Success.
Utilize Gov’t and Industry SW Integrated Product teams 









1. Reconstitute the Navy’s in-house applied sw development expertise and Leadership
2. Utilize government and industry software development Integrated Product Teams 
Current
Trends
Future Trend Goals 
* Failures
YR 2000: 84% of programs are late and over budget, and deliveries include only 61% of planned capabilities*
YR 2004: 40% ($8 Billion) of DoD RDT&E Budget was spent on reworking software due to quality issues**
YR 2009: DOD’s 95 major defense acquisition programs have an average cost growth of 26% and an average schedule delay of almost 2 years*** 
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CURRENT STATE CHALLENGES
 Designing and implementing truly Open Architected systems
− standardized interfaces, scalable, reliable, portable, modular
 Assessing, successfully utilizing, and rapidly integrating the most advanced software 
technologies and methodologies:
− Model Driven Architectures, Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), multi-core parallel 
processing, automated code generation, cloud computing, next generation programming 
languages, and agile development processes.
 Integrating the mix of legacy and modern SW and HW components
− new Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) SW & HW components and DoD/Navy developed highly 
specialized and unique components 
− Achieving integrated net-centric systems composed of hundreds-of-millions (possibly billions) of 
lines of code that can execute as systems-of-systems and fully meet mission level objectives and 
Key Performance Parameters (KPPS).
 Achieving Information Assurance (IA) and protection against SW based Cyber-Attacks 
while maximizing COTS utilization and Net-Centric communications. 
 Maintaining government corporate knowledge of the system architecture, design and  
technology utilization as the responsibility for system and software development 
transitions among different private industry organizations during the program life-
cycle.  
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SW Acquisition Approach 
Current State 
System Integration, Testing, & CertSystem Development Activities
Concept Development 
System Requirements
Software Arch, Design, Code & Test
System Arch & Design
Software Integration & Test
Science and Technology Software Engineering 
Improvement 
 Software size, complexity, and reliance is continuing to grow within DoD/Navy critical systems
 DoD/Navy is failing to consistently successfully acquire software intensive systems
− YR 2000: 84% of programs are late and over budget, and deliveries include only 61% of planned capabilities*
− YR 2004: 40% ($8 Billion) of DoD RDT&E Budget was spent on reworking software due to quality issues**
− YR 2009: DOD’s 95 major defense acquisition programs have seen their costs grow by an average of 26% and 
experienced an average schedule delay of almost 2 years*** 
 DOD/Navy is losing its in-house applied software engineering and development expertise
* 2000 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Defense Software Report
** 2004 General Accountability Office Report
*** 2009 Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin at Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, March 3, 2009
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Industry
Government 























Requirements development System Design and Development
Milestone Reviews
System Integration and Test/






Software Architecture and Design
Software Interfaces
System Integration










•Government relies primarily on Industry for: System Requirements Definition, 
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Current State
Typical Software Acquisition Strategy
Materiel
Solutions











Number of Systems that fail 
IOC testing is increasing
Software Development Activities Conducted Primarily
During the System Development and Demo Phase
DoD/ASN/RDA Policies Call for Gov’t SMEs to Define System Req’s, Support Milestone Reviews, and Validate the SW Artifacts Developed by Industry
Technology
Development
SRRITR ASR PDR SRR PDR
A
“The combination of personnel reductions and reduced RDT&E has seriously eroded the Department’s domain knowledge and produced an over 
reliance on contractors to perform core in-house technical functions
-Department of the Navy Acquisition, D. Winter: SECNAV Memo Dated 10 Oct 08 
“  i ti  f r l r ti   r    e c a e s e educ ons and educed T has seri l  r  t  rt ts y e e e e a e ’  i  l   r   r s a k e e a ce a ve
r li   tr t r  t  rf r  r  ie a ce c ac s e c e -  t i l f tise ec ca c ons
- rt t f t   i iti , . i t r:   te a e e avy c s e e a e  t  10 c 08
Engineering and Manufacturing DevB C











Incremental SW Builds 
SW Req’s  
RISKs
Over-reliance on Industry 
for software Development
Gov’t participation 
primarily via Milestone 
Reviews is not sufficient 
Gov’t sw engineer 
participation during sw 
development is minimal
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Computer SW Configuration Item (CSCI)
- Lead CSCI Architecture Design and Code
- Cross Discipline IPT participation
- Complex Tech Problem Resolution
Segment and Component Level Development
- Lead Architecture Design and Implementation
- Cross Organization/Function IPT Leadership and Participation
- Lead Technology insertion
1 to 2 years
Program & Line Management: 
Department Head (500+)
Program Managers for PEOs
Technical Leadership and Oversight
Systems and Domain Level
- AoA Leadership and Execution
-Cost and Schedule Assessment
-Tech Approach Leadership & Approval
Senior Level SW Experts
Domain and System Level LeadershipLine and Program Management Path
Technical Path
Management: Component Level Branch (25 
to 40) Head
Management: System(s) Level
Division (100 to 250) Head










2 to 8 years
Management: CSCI(s) Level






Maintaining Navy in-house SW expertise requires that an appropriate 
subset of critical SW be developed in-house. There is no well defined 
criteria or process for assigning sw development to in-house engineers.
Challenge 2
Maintaining Navy in-house SW expertise requires that an appropriate 
subset of critical SW be developed in-house. There is no well defined 








“In order to acquire the DON platforms and weapons systems in a responsible manner, it is imperative the DoN maintain technical domain expertise at all levels of the 
acquisition infrastructure”.     
-Department of the Navy Acquisition, D. Winter: SECNAV Memo Dated 10 Oct 08 
“I  r er t  ac ire t e  latf r s a  ea s syste s i  a rn o d o qu h D N p o nd pon n es si le a er, it is pon b nn i erative t e  ai tai  tec ical do ain expertise at all lep h DoN n n hn vels f t e o h
ac isiti  i frastr ct requ on n u u ”.     
- e art e t f t e avy c isiti , . i ter:  e  ateD p n o h N A qu on D n SECNAV o D d 10 ct 08 
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Future State Goal
Open Architecture based Product-Line Initiative


































- Transition from Stove-Pipes to Product Lines
- Reduce Cost
- Promote Competition & Innovation





Decouples Hardware from Software
Utilizes Standards-based Interfaces to Network
Componentizes Software Applications




Software Arch, and 
Interfaces
* Promotes Cost 
Avoidance and  Innovation
Gov’t owns the System 
artifacts
(Specs, Code, ..) 
Proprietary
Non-Common 
System & SW Growth
Proprietary
Non-Common 
System & SW Growth
Proprietary
Non-Common 
System & SW Growth
10
10Unclassified Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Future State Challenge:
Maintaining Corporate Knowledge of Objective Architecture
 How does the Navy maintain corporate knowledge and ownership of 
the Objective Architecture as the system evolves over time and is 











System Size and Complexity continues to grow and evolve.
Platform unique instantiations built off  of common core components
Non-Common 
System & SW Growth
Non-Common 
System & SW Growth
Non-Common 
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Future State Challenge: 
Open Architecture Software
* Reference: OA Architectural Principles and Guidelines v 1.5.6, 2008, IBM, Eric M. Nelson, Acquisition Community Website (ACC) DAU Navy OA Website 
These OA “ILITIES” Cannot be Easily Verified by System Testing….. Government In-House SW Expertise Insight Into 
Design and Code is Required to Ensure Reusable Software
Designing and Coding for These “ILITIES” is the Key to Saving Significant  $$$$$$$$
  “I I I ” t  il  ifi   t  tir .. r t I -   ti  I i t I t  r
i    i  i  t   l  ftr r r
i i   i  f   r “I I I ” i  t   t  i  i ifi t  
Composability
The System Provides Recombinant 
Components that can be Selected 
and Assembled in Various Combinations
to Satisfy Specific Requirements
o posability
The System Provides Recombinant 
Components that can be Selected 
and Assembled in Various Combinations
to Satisfy Specific Requirements
Interoperability
Ability of Two or More Subsystem
to Exchange Information and Utilize
that Information
Interoperability
Ability of Two or More Subsystem
to Exchange Information and Utilize
that Information
Open Standards
Standards that are Widely Used,
Consensus Based, Published and
Maintained by Recognized Industry
Standards Organizations
pen Standards
Standards that are idely Used,
Consensus Based, Published and
Maintained by Recognized Industry
Standards Organizations
Maintainability
The Ease With Which Maintenance of
a Functional Unit can be Performed in
Accordance With Prescribed Requirements
aintainability
The Ease ith hich Maintenance of
a Functional Unit can be Performed in
Accordance ith Prescribed Requirements
Extensibility
Ability to add new Capabilities to System
Components, or to add Components
and Subsystems to a System
Extensibility
Ability to add new Capabilities to System
Components, or to add Components
and Subsystems to a System
Modularity
Partitioning into Discrete, Scalable,
and Self-Contained Units of Functionality,
With Well Defined Interfaces
odularity
Partitioning into Discrete, Scalable,
and Self-Contained Units of Functionality,
ith ell Defined Interfaces
Reusability
Ability for an Artifact to Provide





i r  
is a le  y
is acilitate  y
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Future State Challenge: Components Size and Complexity  
Devil is in the Details
A single erroneous SLOC/Character can crash the entire system 
MillionsThousandsHundredsTens
FD Req’s and I/Fs










System Component Relative Sizes


















Gov’t SW SMEs must ensure OA req’s are met at the 





Gov’t SW SMEs must understand the technical design 
and details for complex:
− Data & File Management
− Threading &Tasking Hierarchy
− Initialization /&Termination
− Time Critical & Deterministic Processing





Gov’t technical insight 
only at the Func, Comp, 
or Segment level is not 
















SW CSCI Level Req’s and I/Fs
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OA Success Example
























































Surface Platform Launcher A
Surface Platform Launcher B
Submarine Platform Launcher N
FMS Platform Launcher X
Object Oriented Design



















Open Architecture Achieved at 
The CSCI / Object Level.
•Must maintain Gov’t 
SME expertise at this level
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Industry
Government 
























Majority of Tech Work done by the Gov’t
Gov’t Leads AOAs / Industry may support.
Gov’t Leads Prototyping / Industry may support.
Gov’t Defines System Requirements
Gov’t Defines System/SW Architectures. 
Gov’t Defines Interfaces (I/F).
Gov’t Determines what system components will 
be developed by Industry and In-house SMEs.
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Majority of Technical work done by Industry
Gov’t controls and manages Architectures and I/Fs 
Gov’t leads sw design and development.
Industry develops a majority of the sw components.
Gov’t develops a small subset of the critical sw.
INTEGRATION / TEST
Majority of Tech work by Gov’t
• Gov’t leads System Integration
• Gov’t leads System Test and cert 
• Gov’t and Industry fix SW Defects
• Gov’t controls the Common
Asset Library where final
System Products are stored






Software Architecture and Design
Software Interfaces
System Integration












Requirements development System Design and Development
Milestone Reviews
System Integration and Test/
Operations and Support 
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Integrated Gov’t and Industry Development Teams
Accountability
 Well defined and documented roles and responsibilities
 Common set of well documented cost, schedule, and performance expectations
− Cost and schedule Variance (CPI/SPI) Thresholds and Goals 
− Quantified Key Performance Parameters and Software Quality goals
 Common set of well documented system development processes and metrics
− Business Processes and Technical Processes
 Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) with well defined and agreed to interdependency products 
and associated delivery dates
 Proactive and attentive integrated team management of cost, schedule and technical 
performance
− Frequent regular periodic team communication and risk assessment / management
 Gov’t test team is independent from government sw development team
− Separate management chains
− Test team has direct line of reporting to the Program Office
 Utilization of Milestone Reviews with Independent Competency Experts
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16Unclassified Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Summary
 Reconstitute the government in-house Software Expertise Pipe-line
Work with Navy senior leaders to define the vision, roles and
responsibilities of in-house software development organizations
 Develop and execute the transition plan(s) to accomplish the vision
Recommendations
Develop and maintain in-house technical experts who can lead and 
participate within integrated government and industry software 
development teams that utilize best-practice based technical and 
business processes to provide high quality and reliable War-fighter 
systems that fully meet cost, schedule, and technical performance 
requirements
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Back-Up
 References
 Open Architecture Characteristics 
 Current Typical SW Acquisition Strategy
 Devil is in the Details (System Decomposition)
18
18Unclassified Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
System Acquisition / Development 
Key Elements for Success
















System Int & Test 
Operational Support
Concept Development 
System Req’s and I/Fs
SW Arch, Design, Code, 
SW integration and Test
System Arch / Design
Analysis and Modeling
3 Key Execution Elements Government In-House Expertise Pipeline
61.0, (        )79.0
80.8, (         )87.1






Metrics Based Business Processes
Cost, Schedule, Tech Performance, Risk Management
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Future State































Common, Reusable, Scalable, Modular
Government in-house engineers will develop (architect, design, code, test) a subset of the software
Industry software engineers will still develop a majority of the software components
Platform X
Operating System / Hard Ware
Decouple
H/W from S/WMiddle Ware
Gov’t owns 
the System Arch,
Software Arch, and 
Interfaces
* Promotes Cost 
Avoidance and  
Innovation



















Critical Function l Domain Component






Gov’t develops a small subset of the sw components to invest in the 
gov’t acquisition workforce at no additional cost to the programs
Gov’t contracts out modular components to promote competition 
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Department of the Navy Acquisition
SECDEF
Donald. C. Winter
"In order to acquire DON platforms and weapons systems in a 
responsible manner, it is imperative the DON maintain technical domain 
expertise at all levels of the acquisition infrastructure."
"This combination of personnel reductions and reduced RDT&E has 
seriously eroded the Department's domain knowledge and produced an 
over-reliance on contractors to perform core in-house technical functions. 
This environment has lead to outsourcing the "hands-on" work that is 
needed in-house, to acquire the Nations best science and engineering 
talent and to equip them to meet the challenges of the future Navy."
"The fraction of RDT&E funding at each warfare Center and Laboratory 
should be maintained at a level sufficient to develop and sustain the 
needed technical capabilities of the DON".
NOV 07
2008
Senators Levin and McCain letter to SECDEF Senator
John McCain
Highlights the need for government in-house technical expertise in the 
acquisition workforce, especially in the technical and business domain
NOV 04
2008




"…strategic imperatives that I have received from the ASN(RDA&A) and 
SECNAV..."
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: Reverse the over-reliance on contractors 
performing core Navy acquisition functions.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: Stewardship of the Navy's Laboraties and 
Warfare Centers to ensure long term health and effectiveness.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4: Identify and develop skilled Program 








"I expect growth in the organic acquisition workforce, largely offset by a 
corresponding decrease in outsourced core acquisition (technical and 
business) functions. I request that each PEO/SYSCOM team submit a 
time-phased strategy to increase acquisition organic capabilities by 
reducing dependence on outsourced core acquisition functions." 
REFRENCES FOR SOFTWAR ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT
21









Directs all programs to implement the following core set of metrics:
• Software Size





Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task 
Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation
Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics 
" In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
systems not meeting suitability requirements during IOT&E"."
"there was a loss of a large number of the most experienced  
management and technical personnel ...without an adequate replacement 
pipeline" 
"changes in developmental test and evaluation alone could not remedy 
poor program formulation".
"sequential workforce cuts in the last ten years had a significant adverse 
impact on the DOD acquisition capability". "A significant amount of 
developmental testing is currently performed without needed degree of 
government involvement or oversight"
NOV
2000
Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task 
Force on Defense Software
Office of the Under 




(from review of 6 major previous DOD-wide studies)
• only 16% of programs complete on schedule and within budget
• 31% of programs are canceled and the remaining 53% have cost growth 
greater than 89%
• the average final product includes only 61% of original intended features.
“..from an analysis of 17 major software intensive systems that the level of 
team experience with requirements, architecture, and technology, and 
team processes and communications patterns on similar systems was the 
dominant reason for a projects success or failure..”
"Software is rapidly becoming a significant, if not the most significant, 
portion of DOD acquisitions." 
"Technology is changing more rapidly than ever before...the changes 
make it necessary to stay abreast of the technology, how to apply it, how 
to develop, field and operate the systems that use it".
Recommendations.
Improve software skills of acquisition and program management.
Strengthen and stabalize the technology base.
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Report to Congressional Committees Best Practices: 
Increased focus on requirements and oversight 
needed to improve DODs Acquisition Environment 
and weapon System Quality (GAO-08294)
Government Accounting 
Office (GAO)
Analyzed 11 major DOD weapon Systems.
"defense contractors poor practices for system engineering activities as 
well as manufacturing and supplier quality problems" contributed to 
significant failures wit regards to cost, schedule and technical 
performance.
DOD needs to adopt a knowledge based acquisition approach...high 




ASN/RDA Software Process Improvement Initiative 
(SPII) Software Acquisition Management (SAM) 
Focus Team "As-Is" and 'To-Be" State Reports.
ASN/RDA 
Chief Engineer 
Assessed numerous previously existing DOD/Navy studies and reports; 
and found the following 7 common SW Intensive System Acquisition 
management problems:
Lack of effective acquisition management
Immature acquirer (program offices)
Ineffective requirements management
High personnel turnover in the acquiring organizations
Unrealistic Cost and Schedule Estimates
Ineffective utilization of EVMS for SW
Failure to take advantage of lessons learned 
'To-Be" report recommendations for each of the 7 critical problems ALL 
include requiring the government to train and better utilize Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs).
